Japan had murdered over 20 million civilians throughout Asia by this point in the war. They would have slaughtered millions more if not for the atomic bombs and subsequent surrender. Please take note Mr. Benson.
Tell me who started the war and presided over most of it? Hint: it the same party that spent trillions of dollars on useless wars and have nothing to show for it except terrorism.
He still has to deal with the world as it is. He certainly pulled out a lot more troops than he has sent in. Those who are there are trying to control ISIS. The middle east is a very unstable area where it is far from clear what the best approach is to try to provide stability, It is not a good thing when local government and gangs are so bad millions of people try to escape and find a decent place to live. That affects the rest of the world and you just cannot ignore it.
So first he is the “Apologist-in-Chief” then he is too weak, then he is a “non-apologist”. Did you check your Fox news before drawing this? I think you got your Conservative talk points crossed.There is talk of him cutting nuclear stock piles and apologizing, not blowing stuff up and not apologizing. Are all of the right-winger toonists in shock today? They seem to be really phoning it in. Has Trump really shaken up the right that much?
And has overseen a gradual draw down of troups in at least an attempt to not increase the chaos in the region destabilized by the actions of George W. and his invasion to get rich es for Haliburton, et al, oops I mean the weapons of mass destruction that they had no evidence of and just flat out lied about being in existence.
There was some discussion of a mutual apology – after all, Japan attacked first, enslaved women (still have a hard time admitting that one), conquered territory, and bombed us — but I guess that didn’t happen.
You know Obama can’t close Gitmo without the consent of Congress. And you also know Congress won’t give him the time of day, though they’re happy to blame their obstructionism on him.
Then again, maybe you don’t know these simple facts. So please stop talking.
Back when my father worked for the old Atomic Energy Commission, in the early 1960s, the government decided to declassify the photos of the original bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They expected to get some negative reaction from Japan, but they had no good reason any more to keep the photos classified, so they went ahead, on December 7th. Well, the Japanese government was in no position on December 7th to complain to the US about anything. A reporter congratulated my father for being so clever in the timing, but my father said that the timing was completely accidental and innocent.
We are talking about HIroshima, not about the possibility of WW III with China compliments of MacArthur in the following decade.
Quit trying to wiggle out of the corner you’re in by trying to change the subject. That is a tactic commonly used by who have lost the argument. They attempt to change the venue.
I spoke with an American scientist in Hiroshima who was doing research on post-bomb leukemia rates among Hiroshima’s innocent civilian survivors.
I visited Hiroshima’s A-bomb museum; saw the “shadow” peoples’ body images that were left on concrete walls and sidewalks when their bodies were virtually incinerated by the blast; went to the site of the mass grave of tens of thousands of unidentifiable Hiroshima civilians whose ashes are buried there; walked through the city’s Heiwa Koen (Peace Park); saw and spoke with Hiroshima bomb survivors; and learned Japanese from a sensei whose mother and brother were killed by the Hiroshima A-bomb;.
I also lived in Okinawa, where I traversed battle sites and war memorials located there.
For the record, was Hiroshima part of Germany. or is this something that you have invented in attempt to win the argument by redirecting the venue to an off-site location? I can’t help it if you wish to change the subject from the Hiroshima bomb drop to your personal research on small-nuke effects on tanks in Germany.
You appear not to be able to address or deal with contemporaneous high-level American military perspectives from Hiroshima’s bomb-drop days that do not square with your opinion—including those of MacArthur, Eisenhower, Marshall, Leahy and others that you seem to know little or nothing about. That’s your problem, not mine.
Complicating matters, however, Truman demanded unconditional surrender from the Japanese imperial governement—which the Japanese people thought meant giving up their Emperor (whom they regarded as divine) as a prisoner of war for likely execution in Tokyo.
It has been argued by some historians that the initial refusal by Truman to allow for conditional terms of surrender actually contributed to extending the war longer than necessary. Instead, the war could have been concluded before August of 1945 if Japan had been provided the opportunity of retaining its Emperor in return for surrendering.
Leave it to fumbling Truman to reverse himself by, after the nuking of Japanese cities, allowing Japan to accept terms of conditional surrender—meaning that the Japanese people could keep their Emperor after all. By failing to take the first approach, Truman, in reality, contributed to the increase in American battlefield casualties throughout the summer of 1945.
You persist in your pathological impulse to defend the deliberate butchering of innocent civilians en masse—which, by the way, is an international war crime—and which, if the U.S. had lost the war. would have meant that the American high command would have, no doubt, been executed as war criminals.
It is no coincidence that American prosecutors at Nuremberg did not pursue charges against the Germans for crimes against humanity based upon Nazi aerial bombardment of civilian population centers such as Nottingham and Rotterdam.
Why?
Because that would have left the United States open to counter-attack by German defense lawyers for having deliberately targeted innocent civilian populations for death in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
And I see that you still haven’t stood down the arguments against using the A-bomb as expressed by Eisenhower, Leahy, Marshall, et al. You can’t because you don’t have their brains, their morality or their guts. Not to mention, you haven’t done your homework as it relates to their positions on this matter.
You’re simply into mass-murdering innocent civilian non-combatants if you think it will help you win a war.
Welcome to the world of the barbarian. You’ll fit right in—with the Americans, the Germans and the Japanese.
Trump would love you, by the way. He’s in favor of killing the spouses and children of terrorists in order to make the terrorists stop waging war against America.
Why should Obama apologize? He wasn’t even born when it happened and he sure as heck didn’t order either of the bombs. Plus it’s been over 70 years since it happened and it ended the war without further bloodshed on either side. And it allowed the Japanese to surrender and still save face. And I think we made it up to them by helping them rebuild afterwards. I’m sorry for the folks that died, but a lot of people, military and civilian, died in WWII. People just need to quit voting for idiots who preach hatred, bigotry and pathological patriotism.
To the contrary, it is an example of the kind of mindset that you possess that justifies the deliberate, unjustified and inhumane targeting for mass death of innocent, non-combatant civilians in times of war.
For extensive quotes (including references and citations), from U.S. Navy, Air Force and Army officials who opposed the droppting of the atomic bombs on Japan (and so advised Truman), see the following article:
“American Military Leaders Urge President TrumanNot to Drop the Atomic Bomb”
Wow, you need to relax, do some yoga meditation drills and/or ask for outside help when dealing with doodles you don’t like.
For the record, I didn’t say you were a Trump supporter. I said Trump would love you for your solution to terrorism: namely, kill the families of the terrorists. Here’s what I actually said:
“Trump would love you, by the way. He’s in favor of killing the spouses and children of terrorists in order to make the terrorists stop waging war against America.”
You see, Trump shares your benighted view when it comes to dealing with the bad guys: Kill their kids to make ’em stop. It’s your own fault that you think like him.
That duly noted, I sure got your tail feathers in a wringer over this here cartoon. I suspect deeper issues may be at play for you—like denial.
Call up the link on the Navy, Air Force and Army officials who called on Truman not to drop the A-bomb on Japan. If you’re too agitated and hyper-ventilated to do so yourself, here it is:
And now complaining that he didn’t apologize of something that happened before he was born? There is just no pleasing those with tiny minds but endless nonsense.
To use you own words. don’t be so “full of yourself.” The referenced U.S. military leaders from the WW II era knew more about Japan and the A-bomb than you do,
Baslim’s arguments on this matter are standard fare for bomb-drop apologists and are hardly impressive.
For example, his stated reason for not addressing Eisenhower’s objections to the use of atomic weapons against innocent civilians is that Truman dropped the A-bomb anyway.. That’s not an argument; it’s a duck and cover.
Keep in mind that Truman, in his personal journal, described the Nagasaki A-bomb drop as the “murder” of that city’s inhabitants.
Supreme Allied Commander Eisenhower regarded the bomb’s use against civilians as immoral and militarily unnecessary.
Baslim’s response is to ignore Eisenhower completely and hide behind the self-confessed murdering Truman.
Article: “American Military Leaders Urge President Truman Not to Drop the Atomic Bomb”
(Sources: “MILITARY VIEWS About Dropping the Atomic Bomb,” http://www.colorado.edu/AmStudies/lewis/2010/atomicdec.htm; and “The Decision the Atomic Bomb,” http://www.doug-long.com/debate.htm)_____
Part 1 of 7
**"The Joint Chiefs of Staff never formally studied the decision and never made an official recommendation to the President. Brief informal discussions may have occurred, but no record even of these exists. There is no record whatsoever of the usual extensive staff work and evaluation of alternative options by the Joint Chiefs, nor did the Chiefs ever claim to be involved. (See p. 322, Chapter 26)
**"In official internal military interviews, diaries and other private as well as public materials, literally every top U.S. military leader involved subsequently stated that the use of the bomb was not dictated by military necessity.
“Navy Leaders
“(Partial listing: See Chapter 26 for an extended discussion)
**"In his memoirs Admiral William D. Leahy, the President’s Chief of Staff—and the top official who presided over meetings of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined U.S.-U.K. Chiefs of Staff—minced few words:
“’[T]he use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender. . . .
“’[I]n being the first to use it, we . . . adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children. (See p. 3, Introduction)Privately, on June 18, 1945—almost a month before the Emperor’s July intervention to seek an end to the war and seven weeks before the atomic bomb was used—Leahy recorded in his diary:
“’It is my opinion at the present time that a surrender of Japan can be arranged with terms that can be accepted by Japan and that will make fully satisfactory provisions for America’s defense against future trans-Pacific aggression. ’(See p. 324, Chapter 26)
**"Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet stated in a public address given at the Washington Monument on October 5, 1945:
“’The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of Hiroshima and before the Russian entry into the war. (See p. 329, Chapter 26) . . .
**"[Nimitz also stated: ‘The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military standpoint, in the defeat of Japan. . . .’]
**"In a private 1946 letter to Walter Michels of the Association of Philadelphia Scientists, Nimitz observed that ‘the decision to employ the atomic bomb on Japanese cities was made on a level higher than that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.’ (See pp. 330-331, Chapter 26)
**"Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., Commander U.S. Third Fleet, stated publicly in 1946:
“’The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment. . . . It was a mistake to ever drop it. . . . [the scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it. . . . It killed a lot of Japs, but the Japs had put out a lot of peace feelers through Russia long before.’ (See p. 331, Chapter 26)
“’. . . I spent a morning at Cavite in the Philippines with Admiral Frank Wagner in front of huge maps. Admiral Wagner was in charge of air search-and-patrol of all the East Asian seas and coasts. He showed me that in all those millions of square miles there was literally not a single target worth the powder to blow it up; there were only junks and mostly small ones at that.
“’Similarly, I dined one night with Admiral [Arthur] Radford [later Joint Chiefs Chairman, 1953-57] on the carrier Yorktown leading a task force from Ulithi to bomb Kyushu, the main southern island of Japan. Radford had invited me to be alone with him in a tiny room far up the superstructure of the Yorktown, where not a sound could be heard. Even so, it was in a whisper that he turned to me and said: “Luce, don’t you think the war is over?” My reply, of course, was that he should know better than I. For his part, all he could say was that the few little revetments and rural bridges that he might find to bomb in Kyushu wouldn’t begin to pay for the fuel he was burning on his task force.’ (See pp. 331-332, Chapter 26)"_____
**"The Under-Secretary of the Navy, Ralph Bard, formally dissented from the Interim Committee’s recommendation to use the bomb against a city without warning. In a June 27, 1945 memorandum Bard declared:
“’Ever since I have been in touch with this program I have had a feeling that before the bomb is actually used against Japan that Japan should have some preliminary warning for say two or three days in advance of use. The position of the United States as a great humanitarian nation and the fair play attitude of our people generally is responsible in the main for this feeling.
“’During recent weeks I have also had the feeling very definitely that the Japanese government may be searching for some opportunity which they could use as a medium of surrender. Following the three-power conference emissaries from this country could contact representatives from Japan somewhere on the China Coast and make representations with regard to Russia’s position and at the same time give them some information regarding the proposed use of atomic power, together with whatever assurances the President might care to make with regard to the Emperor of Japan and the treatment of the Japanese nation following unconditional surrender. It seems quite possible to me that this presents the opportunity which the Japanese are looking for.
“’I don’t see that we have anything in particular to lose in following such a program. The stakes are so tremendous that it is my opinion very real consideration should be given to some plan of this kind. I do not believe under present circumstances existing that there is anyone in the country whose evaluation of the chances of the success of such a program is worth a great deal. The only way to find out is to try it out.’ (See pp. 225-226, Chapter 18)
**"Rear Admiral L. Lewis Strauss, special assistant to the Secretary of the Navy from 1944 to 1945 (and later chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission), replaced Bard on the Interim Committee after he left government on July 1. Subsequently, Strauss repeatedly stated his belief that the use of the atomic bomb ‘was not necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion. . . .’ (See p. 332, Chapter 26) Strauss recalled:
“‘I proposed to Secretary Forrestal at that time that the weapon should be demonstrated. . . . Primarily, it was because it was clear to a number of people, myself among them, that the war was very nearly over. The Japanese were nearly ready to capitulate. . . . My proposal to the Secretary was that the weapon should be demonstrated over some area accessible to the Japanese observers, and where its effects would be dramatic. I remember suggesting that a good place—satisfactory place for such a demonstration would be a large forest of cryptomaria [sic] trees not far from Tokyo. The cryptomaria tree is the Japanese version of our redwood. . . . I anticipated that a bomb detonated at a suitable height above such a forest . . . would [have] laid the trees out in windrows from the center of the explosion in all directions as though they had been matchsticks, and of course set them afire in the center. It seemed to me that a demonstration of this sort would prove to the Japanese that we could destroy any of their cities, their fortifications at will. . . .’ (See p. 333, Chapter 26)”_____
**"In a private letter to Navy historian Robert G. Albion concerning a clearer assurance that the Emperor would not be displaced, Strauss observed:
“’This was omitted from the Potsdam declaration and as you are undoubtedly aware was the only reason why it was not immediately accepted by the Japanese who were beaten and knew it before the first atomic bomb was dropped.’ (See p. 393, Chapter 31)
**"In his ‘third person’ autobiography (co-authored with Walter Muir Whitehill) the commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet and chief of Naval Operations, Ernest J. King, stated:
“’The President in giving his approval for these [atomic] attacks appeared to believe that many thousands of American troops would be killed in invading Japan, and in this he was entirely correct; but King felt, as he had pointed out many times, that the dilemma was an unnecessary one, for had we been willing to wait, the effective naval blockade would, in the course of time, have starved the Japanese into submission through lack of oil, rice, medicines, and other essential materials.’ (See p. 327, Chapter 26)
**"Private interview notes taken by Walter Whitehill summarize King’s feelings quite simply as: ‘I didn’t like the atom bomb or any part of it.’ (See p. 329, Chapter 26; See also pp. 327-329)
“As Japan faltered in July an effort was made by several top Navy officials—almost certainly including Secretary Forrestal himself—to end the war without using the atomic bomb. Forrestal made a special trip to Potsdam to discuss the issue and was involved in the Atlantic Charter broadcast. Many other top Admirals criticized the bombing both privately and publicly. (Forrestal, see pp. 390-392, Chapter 31; p. 398, Chapter 31) (Strauss, see p. 333, Chapter 26; pp. 393-394, Chapter 31) (Bard, see pp. 225-227, Chapter 18; pp. 390-391, Chapter 31)”_____
“Air Force Leaders (Partial listing:See Chapter 27 for an extended discussion)
**"The commanding general of the U.S. Army Air Forces, Henry H. ‘Hap’ Arnold, gave a strong indication of his views in a public statement only eleven days after Hiroshima was attacked. Asked on August 17 by a New York Times reporter whether the atomic bomb caused Japan to surrender, Arnold said:
“’The Japanese position was hopeless even before the first atomic bomb fell, because the Japanese had lost control of their own air. ’(See p. 334, Chapter 27)
**In his 1949 memoirs Arnold observed that ‘it always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse.’ (See p. 334, Chapter 27)
**Arnold’s deputy, Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, summed up his understanding this way in an internal military history interview:
“’Arnold’s view was that it [the dropping of the atomic bomb] was unnecessary. He said that he knew the Japanese wanted peace. There were political implications in the decision and Arnold did not feel it was the military’s job to question it. (See p. 335, Chapter 27)
**"Eaker reported that Arnold told him:
“’When the question comes up of whether we use the atomic bomb or not, my view is that the Air Force will not oppose the use of the bomb, and they will deliver it effectively if the Commander in Chief decides to use it. But it is not necessary to use it in order to conquer the Japanese without the necessity of a land invasion.’ (See p. 335, Chapter 27)
**"[Eaker also recalled: ‘That was the representation I made when I accompanied General Marshall up to the White House’ for a discussion with Truman on June 18, 1945.]
“On September 20, 1945 the famous ‘hawk’ who commanded the Twenty-First Bomber Command, Major General Curtis E. LeMay (as reported in The New York Herald Tribune) publicly:
“’said flatly at one press conference that the atomic bomb “had nothing to do with the end of the war.” He said the war would have been over in two weeks without the use of the atomic bomb or the Russian entry into the war.’ (See p. 336, Chapter 27)
**"On September 20, 1945 the famous ‘hawk’ who commanded the Twenty-First Bomber Command, Major General Curtis E. LeMay (as reported in The New York Herald Tribune) publicly:
“LeMay: ‘The war would have been over in two weeks without the Russians entering and without the atomic bomb.’
“The Press: ‘You mean that, sir? Without the Russians and the atomic bomb?’ . . .
“LeMay: ‘The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all.’ (See p. 336, Chapter 27)
**"On other occasions in internal histories and elsewhere, LeMay gave even shorter estimates of how long the war might have lasted (e.g., ‘a few days’). (See pp. 336-341, Chapter 27)
**"Personally dictated notes found in the recently opened papers of former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Averell Harriman describe a private 1965 dinner with General Carl ‘Tooey’ Spaatz, who in July 1945 commanded the U.S. Army Strategic Air Force (USASTAF) and was subsequently chief of staff of U.S. Air Forces. Also with them at dinner was Spaatz’s one-time deputy commanding general at USASTAF, Frederick L. Anderson. Harriman privately noted:
“’Both men . . . felt Japan would surrender without use of the bomb, and neither knew why the second bomb was used.’ (See p. 337, Chapter 27)
**"Harriman’s notes also recall his own understanding:
“’I know this attitude is correctly described, because I had it from the Air Force when I was in Washington in April ‘45.’ (See p. 337, Chapter 27)
**"In an official 1962 interview, Spaatz stated that he had directly challenged the Nagasaki bombing:
“‘I thought that if we were going to drop the atomic bomb, drop it on the outskirts—say in Tokyo Bay—so that the effects would not be as devastating to the city and the people. I made this suggestion over the phone between the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings and I was told to go ahead with our targets.’ (See p. 345, Chapter 27)”_____
“Spaatz insisted on receiving written orders before going forward with the atomic bombings in 1945. Subsequently, Lieutenant General Thomas Handy, Marshall’s deputy chief of staff, recalled:
“’Well, Tooey Spaatz came in . . . he said, “They tell me I am supposed to go out there and blow off the whole south end of the Japanese Islands. I’ve heard a lot about this thing, but my God, I haven’t had a piece of paper yet and I think I need a piece of paper.” “Well,” I said, “I agree with you, Tooey. I think you do,” and I said, “I guess I’m the fall guy to give it to you.”’ (pp. 344-345, Chapter 27)
“In 1962 Spaatz himself recalled that he gave ‘notification that I would not drop an atomic bomb on verbal orders—they had to be written—and this was accomplished.’ (p. 345, Chapter 27)
“Spaatz also stated that
“’The dropping of the atomic bomb was done by a military man under military orders. We’re supposed to carry out orders and not question them.’ (See p. 345, Chapter 27)
“In a 1965 Air Force oral history interview Spaatz stressed: ‘That was purely a political decision, wasn’t a military decision. The military man carries out the order of his political bosses.’ (See p. 345, Chapter 27)
“Air Force General Claire Chennault, the founder of the American Volunteer Group (the famed ‘Flying Tigers’)—and Army Air Forces commander in China—was even more blunt: A few days after Hiroshima was bombed The New York Times reported Chennault’s view that:
“’Russia’s entry into the Japanese war was the decisive factor in speeding its end and would have been so even if no atomic bombs had been dropped. . . . ’ (See pp. 335-336, Chapter 27)_____
“(Partial listing:See Chapter 28 for an extended discussion)
“On the 40th Anniversary of the bombing former President Richard M. Nixon reported that:
“’[General Douglas] MacArthur once spoke to me very eloquently about it, pacing the floor of his apartment in the Waldorf. He thought it a tragedy that the Bomb was ever exploded. MacArthur believed that the same restrictions ought to apply to atomic weapons as to conventional weapons, that the military objective should always be limited damage to noncombatants. . . . MacArthur, you see, was a soldier. He believed in using force only against military targets, and that is why the nuclear thing turned him off. . . .’ (See p. 352, Chapter 28)
“The day after Hiroshima was bombed MacArthur’s pilot, Weldon E. Rhoades, noted in his diary:
“’General MacArthur definitely is appalled and depressed by this Frankenstein monster [the bomb]. I had a long talk with him today, necessitated by the impending trip to Okinawa. . . .’ (See p. 350, Chapter 28)
“Former President Herbert Hoover met with MacArthur alone for several hours on a tour of the Pacific in early May 1946. His diary states:
“’I told MacArthur of my memorandum of mid-May 1945 to Truman, that peace could be had with Japan by which our major objectives would be accomplished. MacArthur said that was correct and that we would have avoided all of the losses, the Atomic bomb, and the entry of Russia into Manchuria.’ (See pp. 350-351, Chapter 28)
“Saturday Review of Literature editor Norman Cousins also later reported that MacArthur told him he saw no military justification for using the atomic bomb, and that ‘The war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor.’ (See p. 351, Chapter 28)
“In an article reprinted in 1947 by Reader’s Digest, Brigadier General Bonner Fellers (in charge of psychological warfare on MacArthur’s wartime staff and subsequently MacArthur’s military secretary in Tokyo) stated:
“’Obviously . . . the atomic bomb neither induced the Emperor’s decision to surrender nor had any effect on the ultimate outcome of the war.’ (See p. 352, Chapter 28)
“Colonel Charles ‘Tick’ Bonesteel, 1945 chief of the War Department Operations Division Policy Section, subsequently recalled in a military history interview: ‘[T]he poor damn Japanese were putting feelers out by the ton so to speak, through Russia. . . . .’ (See p. 359, Chapter 28)
“Brigadier Gen. Carter W. Clarke, the officer in charge of preparing MAGIC intercepted cable summaries in 1945, stated in a 1959 interview:
“’[W]e brought them [the Japanese] down to an abject surrender through the accelerated sinking of their merchant marine and hunger alone, and when we didn’t need to do it, and we knew we didn’t need to do it, and they knew that we knew we didn’t need to do it, we used them as an experiment for two atomic bombs.’ (See p. 359, Chapter 28)
“In a 1985 letter recalling the views of Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, former Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy elaborated on an incident that was
}]very vivid in my mind. . . . I can recall as if it were yesterday, [Marshall’s] insistence to me that whether we should drop an atomic bomb on Japan was a matter for the President to decide, not the Chief of Staff since it was not a military question . . . the question of whether we should drop this new bomb on Japan, in his judgment, involved such imponderable considerations as to remove it from the field of a military decision.’ (See p. 364, Chapter 28)
“In a separate memorandum written the same year McCloy recalled: ‘General Marshall was right when he said you must not ask me to declare that a surprise nuclear attack on Japan is a military necessity. It is not a military problem.’ (See p. 364, Chapter 28)”_____
- "On May 29, 1945 Marshall joined with Secretaries Stimson and Forrestal in approving Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew’s proposal that the unconditional surrender language be clarified (but, with Stimson, proposed a brief delay). (See pp. 53-54, Chapter 4)
- "On June 9, 1945, along with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marshall recommended that a statement clarifying the surrender terms be issued on the fall of Okinawa (June 21). (See pp. 55-57, Chapter 4)
- "On July 16, 1945 at Potsdam—again along with the other members of the Joint Chiefs —Marshall urged the British Chiefs of Staff to ask Churchill to approach Truman about clarifying the terms. (See pp. 245-246, Chapter 19)
- "On July 18, 1945, Marshall led the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in directly urging the president to include language in the Potsdam Proclamation allowing Japan to choose its own form of government. (See pp. 299-300, Chapter 23)
“In his memoirs President Dwight D. Eisenhower reports the following reaction when Secretary of War Stimson informed him the atomic bomb would be used:
“’During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. . . . ’(See p. 4, Introduction)
“Eisenhower made similar private and public statements on numerous occasions. For instance, in a 1963 interview he said simply: ‘. . . it wasn’t necessary to hit them with that awful thing.’ (See pp. 352-358, Chapter 28)”
WestNYC Premium Member about 8 years ago
Japan had murdered over 20 million civilians throughout Asia by this point in the war. They would have slaughtered millions more if not for the atomic bombs and subsequent surrender. Please take note Mr. Benson.
Darsan54 Premium Member about 8 years ago
I am not sure I understand this cartoon. Benson’s aim seems to be off lately. Probably the ODS.
Theodore E. Lind Premium Member about 8 years ago
Tell me who started the war and presided over most of it? Hint: it the same party that spent trillions of dollars on useless wars and have nothing to show for it except terrorism.
Theodore E. Lind Premium Member about 8 years ago
He still has to deal with the world as it is. He certainly pulled out a lot more troops than he has sent in. Those who are there are trying to control ISIS. The middle east is a very unstable area where it is far from clear what the best approach is to try to provide stability, It is not a good thing when local government and gangs are so bad millions of people try to escape and find a decent place to live. That affects the rest of the world and you just cannot ignore it.
1941gko about 8 years ago
World View – Obama got the Peace Prize for just Getting Elected POTUS in a Racist Society!
Happy Two Shoes about 8 years ago
Obama got the prize because the world was terrified of GW Bush the insane invader. The world said, “Anybody but Bush.”
Mr. Blawt about 8 years ago
So first he is the “Apologist-in-Chief” then he is too weak, then he is a “non-apologist”. Did you check your Fox news before drawing this? I think you got your Conservative talk points crossed.There is talk of him cutting nuclear stock piles and apologizing, not blowing stuff up and not apologizing. Are all of the right-winger toonists in shock today? They seem to be really phoning it in. Has Trump really shaken up the right that much?
JBBLAW about 8 years ago
And has overseen a gradual draw down of troups in at least an attempt to not increase the chaos in the region destabilized by the actions of George W. and his invasion to get rich es for Haliburton, et al, oops I mean the weapons of mass destruction that they had no evidence of and just flat out lied about being in existence.
Motivemagus about 8 years ago
There was some discussion of a mutual apology – after all, Japan attacked first, enslaved women (still have a hard time admitting that one), conquered territory, and bombed us — but I guess that didn’t happen.
Not the Smartest Man On the Planet -- Maybe Close Premium Member about 8 years ago
You know Obama can’t close Gitmo without the consent of Congress. And you also know Congress won’t give him the time of day, though they’re happy to blame their obstructionism on him.
Then again, maybe you don’t know these simple facts. So please stop talking.
lonecat about 8 years ago
Back when my father worked for the old Atomic Energy Commission, in the early 1960s, the government decided to declassify the photos of the original bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They expected to get some negative reaction from Japan, but they had no good reason any more to keep the photos classified, so they went ahead, on December 7th. Well, the Japanese government was in no position on December 7th to complain to the US about anything. A reporter congratulated my father for being so clever in the timing, but my father said that the timing was completely accidental and innocent.
moderateisntleft about 8 years ago
so your complaining that obama didn’t clean up somebody else f-up?
RabbitDad about 8 years ago
Tinker-Tailor is moving the goalposts…
sjsczurek about 8 years ago
What is the point of this cartoon?
stevebenson about 8 years ago
Your argument is with U.S. military commanders at the time of the bomb drops with whom you disagree.
Too bad Lt. William Calley didn’t have you for a defense attorney.
stevebenson about 8 years ago
We are talking about HIroshima, not about the possibility of WW III with China compliments of MacArthur in the following decade.
Quit trying to wiggle out of the corner your in by trying to change the subject. That is a tactic commonly used by who have lost the argument.
They attempt to change the venue.
stevebenson about 8 years ago
Interesting, but this is not about your Cold War study of the effect of smaller nukes on tanks in the German theater.
This is about what happened to Hiroshima in WW II.
stevebenson about 8 years ago
Here’s a book that you clearly could benefit from reading:
“The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,” by Gar Alperovitz
stevebenson about 8 years ago
We are talking about HIroshima, not about the possibility of WW III with China compliments of MacArthur in the following decade.
Quit trying to wiggle out of the corner you’re in by trying to change the subject. That is a tactic commonly used by who have lost the argument. They attempt to change the venue.
stevebenson about 8 years ago
I lived in Hiroshima.
I spoke with an American scientist in Hiroshima who was doing research on post-bomb leukemia rates among Hiroshima’s innocent civilian survivors.
I visited Hiroshima’s A-bomb museum; saw the “shadow” peoples’ body images that were left on concrete walls and sidewalks when their bodies were virtually incinerated by the blast; went to the site of the mass grave of tens of thousands of unidentifiable Hiroshima civilians whose ashes are buried there; walked through the city’s Heiwa Koen (Peace Park); saw and spoke with Hiroshima bomb survivors; and learned Japanese from a sensei whose mother and brother were killed by the Hiroshima A-bomb;.
I also lived in Okinawa, where I traversed battle sites and war memorials located there.
For the record, was Hiroshima part of Germany. or is this something that you have invented in attempt to win the argument by redirecting the venue to an off-site location? I can’t help it if you wish to change the subject from the Hiroshima bomb drop to your personal research on small-nuke effects on tanks in Germany.
You appear not to be able to address or deal with contemporaneous high-level American military perspectives from Hiroshima’s bomb-drop days that do not square with your opinion—including those of MacArthur, Eisenhower, Marshall, Leahy and others that you seem to know little or nothing about. That’s your problem, not mine.
lonecat about 8 years ago
If you’re going to have wars, you’re going to have atrocities. I guess that’s one big reason I’m a pacifist.
stevebenson about 8 years ago
Japan was beaten—and knew it.
Complicating matters, however, Truman demanded unconditional surrender from the Japanese imperial governement—which the Japanese people thought meant giving up their Emperor (whom they regarded as divine) as a prisoner of war for likely execution in Tokyo.
It has been argued by some historians that the initial refusal by Truman to allow for conditional terms of surrender actually contributed to extending the war longer than necessary. Instead, the war could have been concluded before August of 1945 if Japan had been provided the opportunity of retaining its Emperor in return for surrendering.
Leave it to fumbling Truman to reverse himself by, after the nuking of Japanese cities, allowing Japan to accept terms of conditional surrender—meaning that the Japanese people could keep their Emperor after all. By failing to take the first approach, Truman, in reality, contributed to the increase in American battlefield casualties throughout the summer of 1945.
You persist in your pathological impulse to defend the deliberate butchering of innocent civilians en masse—which, by the way, is an international war crime—and which, if the U.S. had lost the war. would have meant that the American high command would have, no doubt, been executed as war criminals.
It is no coincidence that American prosecutors at Nuremberg did not pursue charges against the Germans for crimes against humanity based upon Nazi aerial bombardment of civilian population centers such as Nottingham and Rotterdam.
Why?
Because that would have left the United States open to counter-attack by German defense lawyers for having deliberately targeted innocent civilian populations for death in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
And I see that you still haven’t stood down the arguments against using the A-bomb as expressed by Eisenhower, Leahy, Marshall, et al. You can’t because you don’t have their brains, their morality or their guts. Not to mention, you haven’t done your homework as it relates to their positions on this matter.
You’re simply into mass-murdering innocent civilian non-combatants if you think it will help you win a war.
Welcome to the world of the barbarian. You’ll fit right in—with the Americans, the Germans and the Japanese.
Trump would love you, by the way. He’s in favor of killing the spouses and children of terrorists in order to make the terrorists stop waging war against America.
Wendy Emlinger Premium Member about 8 years ago
Why should Obama apologize? He wasn’t even born when it happened and he sure as heck didn’t order either of the bombs. Plus it’s been over 70 years since it happened and it ended the war without further bloodshed on either side. And it allowed the Japanese to surrender and still save face. And I think we made it up to them by helping them rebuild afterwards. I’m sorry for the folks that died, but a lot of people, military and civilian, died in WWII. People just need to quit voting for idiots who preach hatred, bigotry and pathological patriotism.
stevebenson about 8 years ago
Crack a history book.
Calley is not a change of subject.
To the contrary, it is an example of the kind of mindset that you possess that justifies the deliberate, unjustified and inhumane targeting for mass death of innocent, non-combatant civilians in times of war.
stevebenson about 8 years ago
For extensive quotes (including references and citations), from U.S. Navy, Air Force and Army officials who opposed the droppting of the atomic bombs on Japan (and so advised Truman), see the following article:
“American Military Leaders Urge President TrumanNot to Drop the Atomic Bomb”
http://www.colorado.edu/AmStudies/lewis/2010/atomicdec.htm
stevebenson about 8 years ago
Speaking of Trump, it’s Interesting how some nuke heads seem to bother you more than others—this one in particular, which you let slide:
http://www.gocomics.com/stevebenson/2016/03/29#mutable_1422158
:)
stevebenson about 8 years ago
Wow, you need to relax, do some yoga meditation drills and/or ask for outside help when dealing with doodles you don’t like.
For the record, I didn’t say you were a Trump supporter. I said Trump would love you for your solution to terrorism: namely, kill the families of the terrorists. Here’s what I actually said:
“Trump would love you, by the way. He’s in favor of killing the spouses and children of terrorists in order to make the terrorists stop waging war against America.”
You see, Trump shares your benighted view when it comes to dealing with the bad guys: Kill their kids to make ’em stop. It’s your own fault that you think like him.
That duly noted, I sure got your tail feathers in a wringer over this here cartoon. I suspect deeper issues may be at play for you—like denial.
Call up the link on the Navy, Air Force and Army officials who called on Truman not to drop the A-bomb on Japan. If you’re too agitated and hyper-ventilated to do so yourself, here it is:
http://www.colorado.edu/AmStudies/lewis/2010/atomicdec.htm_____
Let me know if there’s anything else I can do to help.
tauyen about 8 years ago
And now complaining that he didn’t apologize of something that happened before he was born? There is just no pleasing those with tiny minds but endless nonsense.
stevebenson about 8 years ago
To Baslim:
To use you own words. don’t be so “full of yourself.” The referenced U.S. military leaders from the WW II era knew more about Japan and the A-bomb than you do,
MaryWorth Premium Member about 8 years ago
Wishing for a 3rd term…
stevebenson about 8 years ago
Baslim’s arguments on this matter are standard fare for bomb-drop apologists and are hardly impressive.
For example, his stated reason for not addressing Eisenhower’s objections to the use of atomic weapons against innocent civilians is that Truman dropped the A-bomb anyway.. That’s not an argument; it’s a duck and cover.
Keep in mind that Truman, in his personal journal, described the Nagasaki A-bomb drop as the “murder” of that city’s inhabitants.
Supreme Allied Commander Eisenhower regarded the bomb’s use against civilians as immoral and militarily unnecessary.
Baslim’s response is to ignore Eisenhower completely and hide behind the self-confessed murdering Truman.
Not a very good sword to choose to fall on.
stevebenson about 8 years ago
Article: “American Military Leaders Urge President Truman Not to Drop the Atomic Bomb”
(Sources: “MILITARY VIEWS About Dropping the Atomic Bomb,” http://www.colorado.edu/AmStudies/lewis/2010/atomicdec.htm; and “The Decision the Atomic Bomb,” http://www.doug-long.com/debate.htm)_____
Part 1 of 7
**"The Joint Chiefs of Staff never formally studied the decision and never made an official recommendation to the President. Brief informal discussions may have occurred, but no record even of these exists. There is no record whatsoever of the usual extensive staff work and evaluation of alternative options by the Joint Chiefs, nor did the Chiefs ever claim to be involved. (See p. 322, Chapter 26)
**"In official internal military interviews, diaries and other private as well as public materials, literally every top U.S. military leader involved subsequently stated that the use of the bomb was not dictated by military necessity.
“Navy Leaders
“(Partial listing: See Chapter 26 for an extended discussion)
**"In his memoirs Admiral William D. Leahy, the President’s Chief of Staff—and the top official who presided over meetings of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined U.S.-U.K. Chiefs of Staff—minced few words:
“’[T]he use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender. . . .
“’[I]n being the first to use it, we . . . adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children. (See p. 3, Introduction)Privately, on June 18, 1945—almost a month before the Emperor’s July intervention to seek an end to the war and seven weeks before the atomic bomb was used—Leahy recorded in his diary:
“’It is my opinion at the present time that a surrender of Japan can be arranged with terms that can be accepted by Japan and that will make fully satisfactory provisions for America’s defense against future trans-Pacific aggression. ’(See p. 324, Chapter 26)
**"Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet stated in a public address given at the Washington Monument on October 5, 1945:
“’The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of Hiroshima and before the Russian entry into the war. (See p. 329, Chapter 26) . . .
**"[Nimitz also stated: ‘The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military standpoint, in the defeat of Japan. . . .’]
**"In a private 1946 letter to Walter Michels of the Association of Philadelphia Scientists, Nimitz observed that ‘the decision to employ the atomic bomb on Japanese cities was made on a level higher than that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.’ (See pp. 330-331, Chapter 26)
**"Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., Commander U.S. Third Fleet, stated publicly in 1946:
“’The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment. . . . It was a mistake to ever drop it. . . . [the scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it. . . . It killed a lot of Japs, but the Japs had put out a lot of peace feelers through Russia long before.’ (See p. 331, Chapter 26)
“’. . . I spent a morning at Cavite in the Philippines with Admiral Frank Wagner in front of huge maps. Admiral Wagner was in charge of air search-and-patrol of all the East Asian seas and coasts. He showed me that in all those millions of square miles there was literally not a single target worth the powder to blow it up; there were only junks and mostly small ones at that.
“’Similarly, I dined one night with Admiral [Arthur] Radford [later Joint Chiefs Chairman, 1953-57] on the carrier Yorktown leading a task force from Ulithi to bomb Kyushu, the main southern island of Japan. Radford had invited me to be alone with him in a tiny room far up the superstructure of the Yorktown, where not a sound could be heard. Even so, it was in a whisper that he turned to me and said: “Luce, don’t you think the war is over?” My reply, of course, was that he should know better than I. For his part, all he could say was that the few little revetments and rural bridges that he might find to bomb in Kyushu wouldn’t begin to pay for the fuel he was burning on his task force.’ (See pp. 331-332, Chapter 26)"_____
(cont.)
stevebenson about 8 years ago
Part 2 of 7
**"The Under-Secretary of the Navy, Ralph Bard, formally dissented from the Interim Committee’s recommendation to use the bomb against a city without warning. In a June 27, 1945 memorandum Bard declared:
“’Ever since I have been in touch with this program I have had a feeling that before the bomb is actually used against Japan that Japan should have some preliminary warning for say two or three days in advance of use. The position of the United States as a great humanitarian nation and the fair play attitude of our people generally is responsible in the main for this feeling.
“’During recent weeks I have also had the feeling very definitely that the Japanese government may be searching for some opportunity which they could use as a medium of surrender. Following the three-power conference emissaries from this country could contact representatives from Japan somewhere on the China Coast and make representations with regard to Russia’s position and at the same time give them some information regarding the proposed use of atomic power, together with whatever assurances the President might care to make with regard to the Emperor of Japan and the treatment of the Japanese nation following unconditional surrender. It seems quite possible to me that this presents the opportunity which the Japanese are looking for.
“’I don’t see that we have anything in particular to lose in following such a program. The stakes are so tremendous that it is my opinion very real consideration should be given to some plan of this kind. I do not believe under present circumstances existing that there is anyone in the country whose evaluation of the chances of the success of such a program is worth a great deal. The only way to find out is to try it out.’ (See pp. 225-226, Chapter 18)
**"Rear Admiral L. Lewis Strauss, special assistant to the Secretary of the Navy from 1944 to 1945 (and later chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission), replaced Bard on the Interim Committee after he left government on July 1. Subsequently, Strauss repeatedly stated his belief that the use of the atomic bomb ‘was not necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion. . . .’ (See p. 332, Chapter 26) Strauss recalled:
“‘I proposed to Secretary Forrestal at that time that the weapon should be demonstrated. . . . Primarily, it was because it was clear to a number of people, myself among them, that the war was very nearly over. The Japanese were nearly ready to capitulate. . . . My proposal to the Secretary was that the weapon should be demonstrated over some area accessible to the Japanese observers, and where its effects would be dramatic. I remember suggesting that a good place—satisfactory place for such a demonstration would be a large forest of cryptomaria [sic] trees not far from Tokyo. The cryptomaria tree is the Japanese version of our redwood. . . . I anticipated that a bomb detonated at a suitable height above such a forest . . . would [have] laid the trees out in windrows from the center of the explosion in all directions as though they had been matchsticks, and of course set them afire in the center. It seemed to me that a demonstration of this sort would prove to the Japanese that we could destroy any of their cities, their fortifications at will. . . .’ (See p. 333, Chapter 26)”_____
(cont.)
stevebenson about 8 years ago
Part 3 of 7
**"In a private letter to Navy historian Robert G. Albion concerning a clearer assurance that the Emperor would not be displaced, Strauss observed:
“’This was omitted from the Potsdam declaration and as you are undoubtedly aware was the only reason why it was not immediately accepted by the Japanese who were beaten and knew it before the first atomic bomb was dropped.’ (See p. 393, Chapter 31)
**"In his ‘third person’ autobiography (co-authored with Walter Muir Whitehill) the commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet and chief of Naval Operations, Ernest J. King, stated:
“’The President in giving his approval for these [atomic] attacks appeared to believe that many thousands of American troops would be killed in invading Japan, and in this he was entirely correct; but King felt, as he had pointed out many times, that the dilemma was an unnecessary one, for had we been willing to wait, the effective naval blockade would, in the course of time, have starved the Japanese into submission through lack of oil, rice, medicines, and other essential materials.’ (See p. 327, Chapter 26)
**"Private interview notes taken by Walter Whitehill summarize King’s feelings quite simply as: ‘I didn’t like the atom bomb or any part of it.’ (See p. 329, Chapter 26; See also pp. 327-329)
“As Japan faltered in July an effort was made by several top Navy officials—almost certainly including Secretary Forrestal himself—to end the war without using the atomic bomb. Forrestal made a special trip to Potsdam to discuss the issue and was involved in the Atlantic Charter broadcast. Many other top Admirals criticized the bombing both privately and publicly. (Forrestal, see pp. 390-392, Chapter 31; p. 398, Chapter 31) (Strauss, see p. 333, Chapter 26; pp. 393-394, Chapter 31) (Bard, see pp. 225-227, Chapter 18; pp. 390-391, Chapter 31)”_____
(cont.)
stevebenson about 8 years ago
Part 4 of 7
“Air Force Leaders (Partial listing:See Chapter 27 for an extended discussion)
**"The commanding general of the U.S. Army Air Forces, Henry H. ‘Hap’ Arnold, gave a strong indication of his views in a public statement only eleven days after Hiroshima was attacked. Asked on August 17 by a New York Times reporter whether the atomic bomb caused Japan to surrender, Arnold said:
“’The Japanese position was hopeless even before the first atomic bomb fell, because the Japanese had lost control of their own air. ’(See p. 334, Chapter 27)
**In his 1949 memoirs Arnold observed that ‘it always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse.’ (See p. 334, Chapter 27)
**Arnold’s deputy, Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, summed up his understanding this way in an internal military history interview:
“’Arnold’s view was that it [the dropping of the atomic bomb] was unnecessary. He said that he knew the Japanese wanted peace. There were political implications in the decision and Arnold did not feel it was the military’s job to question it. (See p. 335, Chapter 27)
**"Eaker reported that Arnold told him:
“’When the question comes up of whether we use the atomic bomb or not, my view is that the Air Force will not oppose the use of the bomb, and they will deliver it effectively if the Commander in Chief decides to use it. But it is not necessary to use it in order to conquer the Japanese without the necessity of a land invasion.’ (See p. 335, Chapter 27)
**"[Eaker also recalled: ‘That was the representation I made when I accompanied General Marshall up to the White House’ for a discussion with Truman on June 18, 1945.]
“On September 20, 1945 the famous ‘hawk’ who commanded the Twenty-First Bomber Command, Major General Curtis E. LeMay (as reported in The New York Herald Tribune) publicly:
“’said flatly at one press conference that the atomic bomb “had nothing to do with the end of the war.” He said the war would have been over in two weeks without the use of the atomic bomb or the Russian entry into the war.’ (See p. 336, Chapter 27)
**"On September 20, 1945 the famous ‘hawk’ who commanded the Twenty-First Bomber Command, Major General Curtis E. LeMay (as reported in The New York Herald Tribune) publicly:
“LeMay: ‘The war would have been over in two weeks without the Russians entering and without the atomic bomb.’
“The Press: ‘You mean that, sir? Without the Russians and the atomic bomb?’ . . .
“LeMay: ‘The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all.’ (See p. 336, Chapter 27)
**"On other occasions in internal histories and elsewhere, LeMay gave even shorter estimates of how long the war might have lasted (e.g., ‘a few days’). (See pp. 336-341, Chapter 27)
**"Personally dictated notes found in the recently opened papers of former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Averell Harriman describe a private 1965 dinner with General Carl ‘Tooey’ Spaatz, who in July 1945 commanded the U.S. Army Strategic Air Force (USASTAF) and was subsequently chief of staff of U.S. Air Forces. Also with them at dinner was Spaatz’s one-time deputy commanding general at USASTAF, Frederick L. Anderson. Harriman privately noted:
“’Both men . . . felt Japan would surrender without use of the bomb, and neither knew why the second bomb was used.’ (See p. 337, Chapter 27)
**"Harriman’s notes also recall his own understanding:
“’I know this attitude is correctly described, because I had it from the Air Force when I was in Washington in April ‘45.’ (See p. 337, Chapter 27)
**"In an official 1962 interview, Spaatz stated that he had directly challenged the Nagasaki bombing:
“‘I thought that if we were going to drop the atomic bomb, drop it on the outskirts—say in Tokyo Bay—so that the effects would not be as devastating to the city and the people. I made this suggestion over the phone between the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings and I was told to go ahead with our targets.’ (See p. 345, Chapter 27)”_____
(cont.)
stevebenson about 8 years ago
Part 5 of 7
“Spaatz insisted on receiving written orders before going forward with the atomic bombings in 1945. Subsequently, Lieutenant General Thomas Handy, Marshall’s deputy chief of staff, recalled:
“’Well, Tooey Spaatz came in . . . he said, “They tell me I am supposed to go out there and blow off the whole south end of the Japanese Islands. I’ve heard a lot about this thing, but my God, I haven’t had a piece of paper yet and I think I need a piece of paper.” “Well,” I said, “I agree with you, Tooey. I think you do,” and I said, “I guess I’m the fall guy to give it to you.”’ (pp. 344-345, Chapter 27)
“In 1962 Spaatz himself recalled that he gave ‘notification that I would not drop an atomic bomb on verbal orders—they had to be written—and this was accomplished.’ (p. 345, Chapter 27)
“Spaatz also stated that
“’The dropping of the atomic bomb was done by a military man under military orders. We’re supposed to carry out orders and not question them.’ (See p. 345, Chapter 27)
“In a 1965 Air Force oral history interview Spaatz stressed: ‘That was purely a political decision, wasn’t a military decision. The military man carries out the order of his political bosses.’ (See p. 345, Chapter 27)
“Air Force General Claire Chennault, the founder of the American Volunteer Group (the famed ‘Flying Tigers’)—and Army Air Forces commander in China—was even more blunt: A few days after Hiroshima was bombed The New York Times reported Chennault’s view that:
“’Russia’s entry into the Japanese war was the decisive factor in speeding its end and would have been so even if no atomic bombs had been dropped. . . . ’ (See pp. 335-336, Chapter 27)_____
(cont.)
stevebenson about 8 years ago
Part 6 of 7
“Army Leaders
“(Partial listing:See Chapter 28 for an extended discussion)
“On the 40th Anniversary of the bombing former President Richard M. Nixon reported that:
“’[General Douglas] MacArthur once spoke to me very eloquently about it, pacing the floor of his apartment in the Waldorf. He thought it a tragedy that the Bomb was ever exploded. MacArthur believed that the same restrictions ought to apply to atomic weapons as to conventional weapons, that the military objective should always be limited damage to noncombatants. . . . MacArthur, you see, was a soldier. He believed in using force only against military targets, and that is why the nuclear thing turned him off. . . .’ (See p. 352, Chapter 28)
“The day after Hiroshima was bombed MacArthur’s pilot, Weldon E. Rhoades, noted in his diary:
“’General MacArthur definitely is appalled and depressed by this Frankenstein monster [the bomb]. I had a long talk with him today, necessitated by the impending trip to Okinawa. . . .’ (See p. 350, Chapter 28)
“Former President Herbert Hoover met with MacArthur alone for several hours on a tour of the Pacific in early May 1946. His diary states:
“’I told MacArthur of my memorandum of mid-May 1945 to Truman, that peace could be had with Japan by which our major objectives would be accomplished. MacArthur said that was correct and that we would have avoided all of the losses, the Atomic bomb, and the entry of Russia into Manchuria.’ (See pp. 350-351, Chapter 28)
“Saturday Review of Literature editor Norman Cousins also later reported that MacArthur told him he saw no military justification for using the atomic bomb, and that ‘The war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor.’ (See p. 351, Chapter 28)
“In an article reprinted in 1947 by Reader’s Digest, Brigadier General Bonner Fellers (in charge of psychological warfare on MacArthur’s wartime staff and subsequently MacArthur’s military secretary in Tokyo) stated:
“’Obviously . . . the atomic bomb neither induced the Emperor’s decision to surrender nor had any effect on the ultimate outcome of the war.’ (See p. 352, Chapter 28)
“Colonel Charles ‘Tick’ Bonesteel, 1945 chief of the War Department Operations Division Policy Section, subsequently recalled in a military history interview: ‘[T]he poor damn Japanese were putting feelers out by the ton so to speak, through Russia. . . . .’ (See p. 359, Chapter 28)
“Brigadier Gen. Carter W. Clarke, the officer in charge of preparing MAGIC intercepted cable summaries in 1945, stated in a 1959 interview:
“’[W]e brought them [the Japanese] down to an abject surrender through the accelerated sinking of their merchant marine and hunger alone, and when we didn’t need to do it, and we knew we didn’t need to do it, and they knew that we knew we didn’t need to do it, we used them as an experiment for two atomic bombs.’ (See p. 359, Chapter 28)
“In a 1985 letter recalling the views of Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, former Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy elaborated on an incident that was
}]very vivid in my mind. . . . I can recall as if it were yesterday, [Marshall’s] insistence to me that whether we should drop an atomic bomb on Japan was a matter for the President to decide, not the Chief of Staff since it was not a military question . . . the question of whether we should drop this new bomb on Japan, in his judgment, involved such imponderable considerations as to remove it from the field of a military decision.’ (See p. 364, Chapter 28)
“In a separate memorandum written the same year McCloy recalled: ‘General Marshall was right when he said you must not ask me to declare that a surprise nuclear attack on Japan is a military necessity. It is not a military problem.’ (See p. 364, Chapter 28)”_____
(cont.}
stevebenson about 8 years ago
Part 7 of 7
“In addition:
- "On May 29, 1945 Marshall joined with Secretaries Stimson and Forrestal in approving Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew’s proposal that the unconditional surrender language be clarified (but, with Stimson, proposed a brief delay). (See pp. 53-54, Chapter 4)
- "On June 9, 1945, along with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marshall recommended that a statement clarifying the surrender terms be issued on the fall of Okinawa (June 21). (See pp. 55-57, Chapter 4)
- "On July 16, 1945 at Potsdam—again along with the other members of the Joint Chiefs —Marshall urged the British Chiefs of Staff to ask Churchill to approach Truman about clarifying the terms. (See pp. 245-246, Chapter 19)
- "On July 18, 1945, Marshall led the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in directly urging the president to include language in the Potsdam Proclamation allowing Japan to choose its own form of government. (See pp. 299-300, Chapter 23)
“In his memoirs President Dwight D. Eisenhower reports the following reaction when Secretary of War Stimson informed him the atomic bomb would be used:
“’During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. . . . ’(See p. 4, Introduction)
“Eisenhower made similar private and public statements on numerous occasions. For instance, in a 1963 interview he said simply: ‘. . . it wasn’t necessary to hit them with that awful thing.’ (See pp. 352-358, Chapter 28)”